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Abstract: We agree with Chapman & Huffman that human capacities are often assumed to be
unique — or attempts are made to demonstrate uniqueness scientifically — in order to justify the
exploitation of animals and ecosystems. To extend the argument that human exceptionalism is
against our interests, we recommend adopting the One Welfare framework, according to which
animal welfare, environmental sustainability and human wellbeing are inseparably linked. Let us
distinguish ourselves from other animals by resisting our short- and mid-term Darwinian
inclinations, consuming less, reproducing less, and striving for a much longer-term biological
fitness for us all.
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Chapman & Huffman (2018) (C & H) argue that human exceptionalism — the idea that “there are
distinctly human capacities and it is on the basis of these capacities that humans have moral status
and other animals do not” (Gruen, 2017) — is used to justify mistreatment of animals1. As C & H
point out, many of the capacities once presumed to be exclusively human and used to justify
humankind’s dominion over animals have since been found in non-human species, making it
increasingly difficult to define what exactly differentiates humans from animals. We have a moral
imperative to improve our behaviour towards these once “other” beings. Why do attempts to
draw this elusive line between humans and animals persist?
Because they get us off the moral hook: According to Kant’s categorical imperative, we
should never use another person merely as a means to our own ends (Misselbrook, 2013). Does
it follow that “non-persons” can be used as means to human ends? If we convince ourselves that
we are somehow different or superior to animals, does this justify exploiting them or their
1

For the purposes of this discussion, “animals” refers to species other than humans.

1

Animal Sentience 2018.176: Fawcett & McGreevy on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference

habitat? Utilitarianism, as espoused by Bentham and later proponents like Singer, awards moral
status not according to the capacity to think or reason, but the capacity to suffer (Driver, 2014;
Singer, 1990). Humans don’t have a monopoly on suffering.
Seven years ago, prominent neuroscientists signed the Cambridge Declaration on
Consciousness, according to which “the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique
in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness” (Low et al., 2012). If
animals are conscious, surely they should be treated as such (Bekoff, 2012). Yet the Cambridge
Declaration has not yet changed the behavior of humans towards animals appreciably. Nor has
the acceptance by animal welfare scientists that animals can experience positive and negative
affective states (Mellor, 2012; Mellor and Beausoleil, 2015) as yet done much to reduce human
exploitation of animals. Are animal-based industries preventing these inconvenient truths from
having their full impact?
The growing literature on human behavior and animal welfare shows that knowledge
alone doesn’t change our behaviour2. Scientists themselves are not immune to this inertia.
Conservation biologist Giovanni Bearzi (2009) memorably observed “excellent biologists who
spend much of their professional lives condemning unsustainable fisheries or reporting high levels
of toxic contaminants in marine megafauna, yet when eating at a restaurant … order swordfish or
tuna from overfished and declining stocks.” C & H note that human exceptionalism has facilitated
the exploitation of animals and the environment to a degree that even threatens human survival,
a concern echoed by scientists globally (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1997; Ripple et al., 2017).
C & H suggest that rather than focusing on distinguishing ourselves from animals, we
should consider how much we have in common, valuing what we can learn from other species.
This, they argue, will ensure that we take their interests into account when considering choices
like whether to use palm-oil or what foods we eat.
We agree that human exceptionalism can be short-sighted and destructive. While
scientists continue to debate whether fish feel pain (Key, 2016), we keep overfishing and polluting
waterways, decimating species, reducing biodiversity and choking ecosystems with plastic waste
(World Economic Forum, 2016). But if we wait until humans are convinced of the intrinsic value
of other species before these trends are acknowledged and reversed, it may never happen. We
already have irrefutable evidence that human impact on wildlife and the ecosystems that support
it is catastrophic.
C & H warn that “we cannot survive without many of these other species today; it is
because of the existence of other species that we exist.” But political leaders do not seem to be
listening. How many understand that, apart from the intrinsic value of biodiversity, reducing it
threatens our food and water supply in the foreseeable future? According to Food in the
Anthropocene (Willett et al., 2019), “biodiversity enhances ecosystem services necessary for
human wellbeing, including food production, pollination, pest control, heat regulation, carbon
sinks, and moisture feedback for rainfall…. The diversity and richness of all living organisms on
land and in water is necessary for the stability of ecosystems, and productivity and resilience of
food production systems”(Willett et al., 2019).
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See http://www.hbcforanimals.com/ for examples of projects designed to change human behaviour to improve
animal welfare.
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The One Welfare framework recognises that animal welfare, human wellbeing and
environmental sustainability are inextricably linked (Colonius and Earley, 2013; Garcia Pinillos,
2018; Garcia Pinillos et al., 2016). This framework is agnostic about human exceptionalism, noting
only that our fates are connected to the lives of others we have been treating as if they were an
infinite resource. It does not rely on the recognition of animal rights (although it does require
respect for animals (OIE, 2017)); nor does it restrict consideration to human agents or animals
who demonstrate human-like capacities. It recognizes wellbeing and welfare as common,
fundamental needs of animals, humans and ecosystems.
The speed of climate change and the shrinking of finite planetary resources dictate that
human self-interest in breeding and consumption be reduced in order to support the
environment. The challenge is to convince humans that the choices we make daily – whether in
consuming animal products, using energy, managing waste, designing our buildings or navigating
the planet – can have harmful consequences for animal welfare, the environment as well as
ourselves (Fraser and MacRae, 2011; Fraser, 2012). We need to be convinced that such
consequences can be avoided through alternative choices that promote One Welfare.
Perhaps we need to draw on two potentially exceptional human capacities after all: the
ability to act as stewards of animal welfare and environmental sustainability on a global scale, and
the ability to think counterintuitively and anticipate delayed rewards. One Welfare requires that
we truly distinguish ourselves from other animals by resisting our short- and mid-term Darwinian
inclinations, reproducing less, consuming less, and striving for a much longer-term biological
fitness for us all.

References
Bearzi, G. 2009. When swordfish conservation biologists eat swordfish. Conservation Biology,
23, 1-2.
Bekoff, M. 2012. Animals are conscious and should be treated as such. New Scientist.
Chapman, C. A. & Huffman, M. A. 2018. Why do we want to think humans are different? Animal
Sentience 23(1).
Colonius, T. J. & Earley, R. W. 2013. One welfare: a call to develop a broader framework of
thought and action. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, 242, 309-310.
Driver, J. 2014. The history of utilitarianism. In: Zalta, E. N. (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Winter 2014 ed.
Fraser, D. 2012. A "practical" ethic for animals. Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics,
25, 721-746.
Fraser, D. & Macrae, A. M. 2011. Four types of activities that affect animals: implications for
animal welfare science and animal ethics philosophy. Animal Welfare, 20, 581-590.
Garcia Pinillos, R. 2018. One Welfare: A Framework to Improve Animal Welfare and Human
Wellbeing. Oxfordshire, UK, CABI.
Garcia Pinillos, R., Appleby, M., Manteca, X., Scott-Park, F., Smith, C. & Velarde, A. 2016. One
Welfare - a platform for improving human and animal welfare. Veterinary Record, 179, 412413.
Gruen, L. 2017. The Moral Status of Animals.

3

Animal Sentience 2018.176: Fawcett & McGreevy on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference

Key, B. 2016. Why fish do not feel pain. Animal Sentience 3(1).
Low, P., Panksepp, J., Reiss, D., Edelman, D., Van Swinderen, B. & Koch, C. 2012. The Cambridge
Declaration of Consciousness. In: Low, P. (Ed.), Francis Crick Memorial Conference on
Consciousness in Human and Non-Human Animals. Churchill College, University of
Cambridge.
Mellor, D. J. 2012. Animal emotions, behaviour and the promotion of positive welfare states.
New Zealand Veterinary Journal, 60, 1-8.
Mellor, D. J. & Beausoleil, N. J. 2015. Extending the 'Five Domains' model for animal welfare
assessment to incorporate positive welfare states. Animal Welfare, 24, 241-253.
Misselbrook, D. 2013. Duty, Kant and Deontology. British Journal of General Practice, 63, 211.
OIE, World Organization for Animal Health. 2017. OIE Global Animal Welfare Strategy.
Ripple, W. J., Wolf, C., Newsome, T. M., Galetti, M., Alamgir, M., Crist, E., Mahmoud, M. I.,
Laurance, W. F. & Countries, S. S. F. 2017. World scientists’ warning to humanity: A second
notice. BioScience, 67, 1026-1028.
Singer, P. 1990. Animal Liberation, 2nd Edition. New York, Avon Books.
Union of Concerned Scientists. 1997. World Scientists' Warning to Humanity. Cambridge, MA:
UCS.
Willett, W. et al. 2019. Food in the Anthropocene: the EAT-Lancet Commission on healthy diets
from sustainable food systems. The Lancet.
World Economic Forum. 2016. The new plastics economy: Rethinking the future of plastics.

4

